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Abstract:
The Japanese government has a vested interest in either avoiding discussion of its wartorn past or arguing for a revisionist take. The need to play up Japanese victimization over
Japanese aggression during World War II has led to many museums having their exhibits
censored or revised to fit this narrative goal. During the 1990’s, Japan’s national discourse was
more open to discussions of war crimes and the damage caused by their aggression. This in turn
led to the creation of many “peace museums” that are intended to discuss and confront this
history as frankly as possible. At the beginning of the 21st century, public discourse turned
against these museums and only private museums have avoided censorship. Some museums, like
the Osaka International Peace Center, have been devastated by the censorship. This museum and
other museums with similar narrative issues raise questions about appropriate narrative on
display. What is appropriate to censor for the sake of respect for the dead? What must be
included for the sake of historical accuracy and honesty about the past? These questions are
investigated at four different peace museums throughout Japan.

Keywords: World War II (1931-1945); Japan; China; Korea; Yushukan Museum; Osaka
International Peace Center; Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum; Kyoto Museum for World
Peace; Nanking Massacre; Iris Chang; Shudo Higashinakano; History of Memory; Military
History; International Relations; Religion
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Introduction
From May 31 to July 9, 2016, I visited several World War II museums in Japan. While at
these museums, I made an effort to interview staff members as best as I could in Japanese. I
asked about changes to exhibits, the goals of the various museums, and whether artifacts from
previous exhibits were still maintained. The first, out of convenience, was the Kyoto Museum for
World Peace located on the grounds of Ritsumeikan University in Kyoto. The museum’s exhibits
on World War II were critical, but not overly so. The exhibits’ narrative integrated discussions of
Japanese World War II atrocities into a broader discussion of 20th century warfare and its
consequences. The exhibit was lenient on Japan’s World War II atrocities, but it did not deny
reality. I soon learned this was a rare exception.
At the other end of the spectrum, the Yushukan museum felt like a discussion of history
in a reality that I did not recognize. It paints Japan as unwilling aggressors, its actions as either
justified combat or unforeseen consequences, and it honors all Japanese soldiers while blatantly
ignoring anything they may have done during World War II. The Hiroshima Peace Memorial
Museum was more tolerable only because its focus on the tragedy of the atomic bombings of
Hiroshima left less room for nationalist revisionism of the war that preceded it. It did however
paint US actions as unconscionable while ignoring any Japanese aggression that may have
provoked them. Still, neither of these museums were as infuriating as the first visit to the Osaka
International Peace Center. I had studied this museum beforehand and its previous exhibits had
just finished being altered at the time this project began. The dissonance between the honest
portrayals of history discussed in the original museum compared with the heavily censored
partial history that was seen on June 16, 2016 was eye-opening.

1

Until very recently, the Osaka International Peace Center was praised as a museum that
was respectably honest about Japanese war crimes during World War II while still being largely
focused on the bombings of Osaka by United States war planes. In what was once Exhibit Room
B, the museum showed exhibits from Japan’s imperial conquest of Korea, its violent atrocities in
China, and other actions of extreme cruelty throughout Asia during World War II. In the
entryway to this room, a small shrine was erected to honor those killed at Auschwitz and to tie
the horrible actions being discussed in Exhibit Room B to the more famous Nazi atrocities. The
Exhibit Room B described above no longer exists. It was removed in 2014 in an attempt to
pretend that the events it depicted never happened. The removal of exhibits that criticize
Japanese World War II aggression and war crimes is not limited to the Osaka International Peace
Center. It is a nationwide trend.
Whether by refusing to take a deliberate position on these issues or seeking moderation in
the debate, the national government and other complicit local governments have chosen to aid
the revisionists by silencing exhibits that directly criticize Japan in museums. The politics of
history of the Japanese government is not conducive to honesty about Japan’s World War II
atrocities. As such, it would rather just bury the issue and only acknowledge the problem when it
is addressed. The desire to avoid chances for audiences to bring up the issues surrounding
Japan’s World War II atrocities has likely contributed to the restriction and censure of publically
funded and managed World War II museums in Japan.
The appearance of peace museums in the early 1990’s led to a far right conservative
backlash amongst some Japanese historians and many in the national government. Individuals
like Professor Higashinakano, a professor of Japanese intellectual history at Asia University in
Tokyo, launched a crusade of protests and critiques of these museums on the grounds that they
2

represent a false history harmful to Japan. This mindset of pro-Japan historical revisionism was
always present in Japanese politics, particularly within the Liberal Democratic Party, but it was
often more moderate. In recent years, the resurgence of the Liberal Democratic Party under
Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and the spread of similarly minded regional government groups has
led to these views becoming far more conservative. In particular, historical revisionism has
targeted peace museums that are seen as being critical of Japan’s World War II history.
While Japan would prefer to simply ignore its distasteful World War II history, the rest of
the world will not permit it. Many Asian neighbors, particularly China and Korea, nurse old
wounds related to Japanese war crimes during World War II that will not be simply forgotten.
Also, Western historians have consistently been just as critical of Imperial Japan’s World War II
conduct as they have been of Nazi Germany’s. Historical amnesia is only possible if the whole
world agrees to the process. The result is that Japan must maintain a discussion of its World War
II history while attempting not to acknowledge the elements of it that other world governments
criticize. As John W. Dower refers to it, Japan approaches its history like items at a supermarket
from which they can, “pick and choose whatever conforms to existing tastes.”1
The Japanese government is too politically invested in burying the issue. The Liberal
Democratic Party (LDP) was formed in the years after World War II and many of its original
members served as officials during the war. It is now one of the largest political parties in Japan,
and includes the current Prime Minister. Shinzo Abe wants to expand Japan’s ability to deploy

1

John W. Dower, Culture of War: Pearl Harbor, Hiroshima, 9-11, Iraq (New York: W.W. Norton &
Company, Inc., 2010), 436.
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its military overseas independently.2 To draw attention to the atrocities of World War II and the
culpability of many of the party’s founding members is politically untenable for the LDP.
Another more recent political party, also politically devoted to burying Japan’s World War II
history, is the Ishin no Kai (Japanese Restoration Party). Led by Toru Hashimoto, former
governor of the Osaka Prefecture, the Ishin no Kai has made criticism of museums like the
Osaka International Peace Center, which until recently had been brutally honest about Japan’s
war guilt, a major feature of its politics.
The desire to erase uncomfortable history from current World War II discussions in Japan
comes into stark focus when viewing Japanese museums regarding World War II. Public
museums are pressured not to confront the dark elements of Japan’s World War II history and
focus on narratives of victimization by the United States. The only museums that are exempt
from these pressures are private collections belonging to specific organizations or universities.
Depictions of what occurred during World War II differ as wildly in museums as the opinions on
the issues at play. This occurs as a result of the handpicked history that the Japanese government
inconsistently chooses to display in museums.
These arbitrary display policies for museums raises a question when looking at public
displays of Japanese WWII history: who is Japan displaying the history in question for? On the
one hand, history museums are meant to enlighten the general populace about their own past and
give them perspectives to aid in viewing the present and possible futures. In this case, one might
argue that excising Japanese war crimes from the museum’s other narrative of Japanese

Richard Lloyd Parry, “Abe pushes Japan to give up ‘peace clause’,” The London Times, April 29, 2015,
accessed May 31, 2016, http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/news/world/asia/article4425154.ece.
2
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victimization in World War II makes explaining the main argument of the museum less
complicated and more focused thematically. One of the workers at the Osaka International Peace
Center who answered questions about the museum’s recent changes, basically said as much
when she stated that the current museum’s historical narrative is easier to explain to any students
who visit the museum.3 Making the messages of the museum’s exhibits clear for the audience is
not necessarily a bad thing. Clarity of message in historical themes is necessary for conveying
your viewpoint to an audience for generations to come.
This call for a more nuanced message not muddied by debates of aggression and guilt
plays into the goals of revisionists because the only subjects being silenced or muted are the ones
they find objectionable. The history of Japanese aggression during World War II is a history of
violent interactions between Japan and many other nations in Asia, particularly China. As Daniel
Levy and Natan Sznaider argue in The Holocaust and Memory in the Global Age, German
historians discussing World War II in Germany history increasingly shifted from a narrative of
German victimization to a narrative regarding the victims of German atrocities during the war. 4
The censoring of the Japanese war crimes display in Exhibit Room B of the Osaka International
Peace Center suggests Japan is attempting to erase these people’s suffering from their own
history because it is inconvenient politically for them to display these memories publically.
Government censorship of an exhibit that was once open about the atrocities committed by the
Japanese army in Korea, China, and other Asian countries during WWII is seen as insensitive to

3

Anonymous source to author, Osaka International Peace Center, June 15, 2016. I feel the statement is
important even if paraphrased and not quoted directly as it summarizes the public viewpoint of those who supported
censure.
4

Daniel Levy and Natan Sznaider, The Holocaust and Memory in the Global Age, translated by Assenka
Oksiloff (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2006), 98.
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victims of the atrocities in other countries. The original exhibit, it could be argued, was designed
to help the people of Japan associate their own victimization during WWII with the victimization
of other countries by the Japanese army. Associating Japanese memories of suffering with the
memories of other peoples’ suffering could promote sympathy and a more balanced perspective
on victimization and the scars of warfare throughout Asia. The current exhibit merely reinforces
the themes of Japanese victimization and the promotion of world peace as a vague, general goal.
Sznaider and Levy point out that the Japanese saw themselves as the ultimate victims of WWII
since they experienced nuclear war.5 However, should this promotion of a national image of
wartime victimization come at the cost of denying the victimization of other groups by the
Japanese? These kinds of issues contribute to an ongoing distrust and animosity on the part of the
Chinese government towards Japan.
Japanese willful ignorance of how their actions are perceived by other countries is not a
new trend either. Former Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi (2001-2006) faced harsh criticism
for attending ceremonies honoring the deceased soldiers interred at the Yasukuni Shrine in 2001.
Several soldiers interred at Yasukuni were convicted Class A war criminals who committed
atrocities in Asia. China and Korea found honoring such people offensive. Current Prime
Minister Abe has also been questioned about the issue of Japanese leaders honoring war
criminals, and this was his response: “Visiting the cemetery [Arlington Cemetery] does not mean
endorsing slavery, even though Confederate soldiers are buried there.”6

5

Levy and Sznaider, The Holocaust and Memory in the Global Age, 40.

Shinzo Abe and Jonathan Tepperman, “Japan is Back: A Conversation with Shinzo Abe,” Foreign Affairs
92, no. 4 (July/August 2013): 5, accessed February 7, 2016 http://www.jstor.org/stable/23526902.
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Comparing American controversies with the Civil War to Japanese controversies with
World War II gets to the core of the problem of Japanese sites of World War II memory.
Japanese World War II memorial sites are complicated. They have both religious implications
for the Japanese but also implications of a history of violence for other countries. What is the
importance of WWII museums for Japan? Are they venues for religious memory casting a fog
over history for the sake of reverence to the dead, or are they sites of historical memory that
Japan often manipulates to only tell the narrative the government wants to discuss?
With these questions in mind, how do Japan and the rest of the world view the
phenomenon of peace museums in a country attempting to deny its past? How have different
Japanese World War II museums with different administrative structures balance government
requirements with the goal of presenting history? The issue of Japanese censorship of World War
II museums has been covered both in Japan and worldwide, and the censorship of the Osaka
International Peace Center has been discussed, but never in the broader context of the Japanese
government and its treatment of peace museums. This paper seeks to argue that the Japanese
government has remained ambivalent about its wartime past and that its ambivalence has helped
to mute and silence discussions of Japanese World War II history in publically funded museums.
This means that only privately funded museums are allowed to be remotely honest about
Japanese wartime aggression, and even they must often moderate their narratives to avoid
rebuke.
Japanese Wartime Aggression: History and Memory
Charles S. Maier’s The Unmasterable Past: History, Holocaust, and German National
Identity contextualized the nature of the problem with the Japanese government silencing World
War II history in its museums. When discussing the history of the German people dealing with
7

the Nazi atrocities, Maier brings up the concept of “reflective memory,” and how it can be used
as a tool to silence the past. To quote Maier, “it can be used, not to confront the past, but to
complicate it. The demand for more subtle historiography can itself serve as a tool of evasion,
‘revision,’ or normalization.”7 The situations are slightly different, but the end result is the same.
The Japanese government’s decision to remain neutral and push for more nuance and a balanced
discussion of the history ultimately ends up assisting the historical revisionists. Policies of
revisionism have resulted in the loss of honest portrayals of history across multiple museums. As
such, understanding the logic of passive silencing through calls for nuance or moderation is part
of this paper’s argument.
The need to push past debate by calling for more nuance results in objectionable material
being removed. Japan needs strong voices for honesty about Japan’s dark World War II past to
avoid the history being silenced in the cries for moderation. One key individual pushing for
honesty is Katsuichi Honda. A Japanese journalist, he is the man who is mostly responsible for
igniting the discussion of the Nanjing Massacre in Japan in the 1970’s. His first book, Chugoku
no tabi [China Trip] set forth key starting points in the debate because it was the first time a
Japanese intellectual used Chinese eyewitness sources as part of his analysis.8 Throughout his
career, Katsuichi has pursued policies of overt hostility to “peace events” and other
commemorations by the Japanese government of its World War II suffering because he believes
that Japan disrespects other cultures when it chooses to ignore others’ suffering in order to

7

Charles S. Maier, The Unmasterable Past: History, Holocaust, and German National Identity
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1988), 161.
See Edward J. Drea, Review of The Nanjing Massacre: A Japanese Journalist Confronts Japan’s
National Shame. H-Net Japan. (November 1999), accessed November 6, 2016. http://www.hnet.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=3599
8
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glorify itself.9 Honda’s key professional trait is “anthropological journalism,” applying
anthropological methodology to his investigative reporting. While Chugoku no tabi did attempt
to study Chinese survivors of World War II, it did not directly confront Japan over its failures in
the postwar period.
The book that directly confronts the issue of Japanese war guilt is The Nanjing Massacre:
A Japanese Journalist Confronts Japan’s National Shame. Published in 1997, the book builds
upon Honda’s previous works to provide a sweeping study of the Nanjing Massacre. Its primary
sources consist of eyewitness accounts from both Japanese Imperial Army soldiers and Chinese
civilians. Furthermore, he openly criticizes the Japanese historians who deny or downplay the
existence of the events he discusses. At one point, he states that historian Tanaka Masaaki’s
attempts to portray the Nanjing Massacre as a hoax were laughable since he selectively uses
testimony and extensively alters it to reinforce his arguments.10
Western scholars did not enter into the debate until after the release of Iris Chang’s Rape
of Nanking. Chang’s book covers a fairly extensive period of time and attempts to analyze every
aspect of this event, its causes, and its postwar memory. The narrative includes studies of the
military mindset of Japan in the years leading up to the war and continues into the late 1980s,
when government officials who attempted to broach the subject faced public and private
harassment. It utilizes a variety of English, Chinese, and Japanese sources. When Chang was

9

See Millie R. Creighton, Review of The Impoverished Spirit of Contemporary Japan: Selected Essays of
Honda Katsuichi by John Lie, Pacific Affairs 67, No. 3 (Autumn 1994): 449, accessed November 29, 2016,
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2760430.
Katsuichi Honda, The Nanjing Massacre: A Japanese Journalist Confronts Japan’s National Shame
(Osaka, JP: Asahi Shimbun Publishing Co. 1999), 187.
10

9

writing another book about the Bataan Death March, she sadly took her own life on November 9,
2004.
The biggest criticism of Iris Chang’s The Rape of Nanking has been the somewhat
unreliable nature of parts of the narrative and certain factual elements. Critics both for and
against discussion of Nanking as a massacre have pointed out holes in the narrative and in the
logic of what is occurring. This ties into the other major criticism of Chang’s book, the lack of
proper research effort. Joshua Fogel stated that while the book was well-intentioned, it often had
wild, unsupportable assertions, did not criticize the evidence provided to her by sources, and
basic factual errors.11 Iris Chang’s work may not be considered scholarly, it still served as a tool
to open discussions about the Nanjing Massacre and to introduce major arguments to Western
audiences. In particular, Honda agreed to have his Nanjing Massacre book translated into
English and other languages in order to inform a more global audience of the discussion. He did
this because he felt foreign politicians, particularly American ones, had been putting pressure on
Japanese bureaucrats to confront the issue and condemn the “disgraceful and anti-internationalist
behavior of the Japanese government and conservative forces.”12 Regardless of intellectual merit,
Iris Chang’s The Rape of Nanking can be credited with starting a frank argument on the topic
among Western scholars.
Iris Chang’s Rape of Nanking serves another purpose in this discussion. Professor Shudo
Higashinakano, a professor of intellectual history at Asia University of Japan in Tokyo, is one of

11

See Joshua A. Fogel, Review of The Rape of Nanking: The Forgotten Holocaust of World War II By Iris
Chang; Japan’s War Memories: Amnesia or Concealment? By George Hicks. The Journal of Asia Studies 57, No. 3
(August 1998): 818-819, accessed November 30, 2016, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2658758.
12
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the more notable voices of conservative revisionism and has devoted much of his professional
life to discrediting Chang’s history and her sources regarding the Nanjing Massacre.
Higashinakano started his career as a professor of German intellectual thought and socialism and
only shifted his research studies to the Nanking Massacre after the fall of the Berlin Wall. After
the book was released, Higashinakano charged that no evidence present in the book provided
genuine proof of Japanese atrocities. In a book he published with Shinjiro Fukunaga and
Kobayashi Susumu called, “Analyzing the ‘Photographic Evidence’ of the Nanking Massacre,”
Higashinakano goes through a series of developments in the narrative of the Nanking
Massacre.13 These early works were later integrated into a much larger narrative dismissing the
Nanjing Massacre called The Nanking Massacre: Fact Versus Fiction. At the core of
Higashinakano’s dismissal of Iris Chang’s work is the argument that all Western discussions
regarding the Nanjing Massacre are linked to unreliable primary sources. This primary source
that Higashinakano seeks to discredit on several occasions is H.J. Timperley’s What War
Means.14
H.J. Timperley, an English speaking news correspondent, also taught as a university
professor in Nanking at the time of the invasion. Higashinakano’s major criticism of Timperley
is that he discovered a document in the Chinese government archives in Taipei from the
Guomindang. This document stated that Timperley was an advisor to a special branch of the
Guomindang’s public relations bureau whose goal was to spread anti-Japanese propaganda.15.

Shudo Higashinakano, Shinjiro Fukunaga, and Kobayashi Susumu, Analyzing the ‘Photographic
Evidence’ of the Nanking Massacre (Tokyo: Soshisha Press. 2005): 9-10, accessed November 5, 2016, http://sdhfact.com/CL02_1/26_S4.pdf.
13

14

Higashinakano, Fukunaga, and Susumu, Analyzing the ‘Photographic Evidence’, 4-6.

15

Higashinakano, Fukunaga, and Susumu, Analyzing the “Photographic Evidence”, 6-7.
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Their book quotes the document, but research did not reveal the document in question so it is
unclear if there is any truth to this assertion. Also, a key primary source that Timperley uses in
What War Means is Miner Searle Bates, a professor at Nanking University in the late 1930’s.
Bates worked on the International Committee in the Nanking Safe Zone during the Japanese
invasion and occupation. The International Military Tribunal of the Far East later called
Timperley as a witness to Japanese war crimes at the Tokyo Trials.16 Higashinakano believes
that Bates knowingly collaborated with the Guomindang’s public relations committee who
manipulated reports coming out of Nanking at the time.
Another key primary source Higashinakano seeks to undermine in his research is The
Good German of Nanking: The Diaries of John Rabe. John Rabe was a German national, and a
member of the Nazi party. He was the man in charge of the Nanjing Safety Zone during the
Japanese invasion. During the period now known as the Nanjing Massacre, Rabe chronicled in
his diary what he saw and heard. A number of those diary entries are integrated into The Good
German of Nanking. Higashinakano criticizes Rabe’s text as being largely hearsay with no actual
eyewitness accounts. Some of his accounts of the population numbers do not match up with
several independent sources that verified the number of Chinese civilians in the Nanjing Safety
Zone at the time of the massacre. 17
Higashinakano himself is not immune from criticism for shoddy research. Sources
Higashinakano tried to discredit in his books have spoken out against his narrative. Xia Shuqin, a
witness and survivor of the Nanjing Massacre, sued him and fellow scholar Toshio Matsumura

“Miner Searle Bates,” Divinity Library, (New Haven, CT: Yale University, January 29, 2016), accessed
February 20, 2017, http://web.library.yale.edu/divinity/nanking/bates.
16

17

Higashinakano, Fukunaga, and Susumu, Analyzing the ‘Photographic Evidence’, 5-7.
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for their claims in the books, “Thorough Review of Nanjing Massacre,” (This text was later
edited and compiled into Fact Versus Fiction) and “The Big Question of the Nanjing Massacre,”
that all evidence of the event was faked including her eyewitness accounts.18 Shuqi’s suit went to
court in Japan, and the Tokyo High Court ruled against Matsumura and Higashinakano.19 They
appealed to the Japanese Supreme Court, but the ruling stood. Higashinakano and Matsumura
were charged with libelous defamation and forced to pay ¥4.5 million in damages.
Higashinakano and Matsumura argued that her family was killed in the footage shot by US
missionary John Magee, which both men claim is fabricated. Xia’s lawyer prepared evidence to
prove her account, but Matsumura and Higashinakano could not discredit the footage or prove
that Xia was not the little girl whose family died on film.
Western scholars have also contributed extensively to this debate. Ian Buruma, a Dutch
historian working in the United States, has covered Japan’s problems with war memory
repeatedly and also explicitly linked and compared it to Germany’s postwar experiences with
war memories. Two books in particular, Zero Year: A History of 1945, and Wages of Guilt:
Memories of War in Germany and Japan, helped to craft the philosophical underpinnings of this
paper’s argument. In The Wages of Guilt, Buruma brings up the contradiction of a history
museum also serving as a memorial site, claiming that you cannot combine a secular,
independent institution with a site for non-confrontational collective ritual without distorting the
purpose of either.20 For Buruma, combining the two only works in an authoritative society.

“Nanjing Massacre Survivor Wins Lawsuit,” Xinhua News Agency (August 24, 2006), accessed
November 16, 2016. http://www.china.org.cn/english/2006/Aug/178925.htm
18

“Chinese hail Nanjing Massacre witness’ libel suit victory,” Xinhua News Agency (February 9, 2009),
accessed November 16, 2016. http://en.people.cn/90001/90776/90883/6587967.html
19

20

Ian Buruma, The Wages of Guilt (New York: Penguin Press, 1995), 218-219.
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Buruma’s extensive focus on the necessity of discussing ideas and how they are presented and
either maintained or lost is key to understanding the implications of censoring war memory in
museums.
Laura Hein is another Western scholar with extensive contributions to the field. Hein is a
professor at Northwestern University who focuses her research on 20th century Japan and how it
interacts with foreign powers. In particular, her research focuses on how Cold War and World
War II politics affected Japanese interactions with the rest of the world. She discusses the key
sources of argument between different groups over museum memory presentation repeatedly.
She distinguishes between US and Japanese perspectives on key issues and also shows
similarities in how each nation approaches the problem.21
For Japanese perspectives on the nature of war memory, Professor Kazuyo Yamane
presents the core arguments while promoting the more liberal perspective. The Professor lectures
on Peace Studies at Kochi University and is the editor of Muse, a biannual bilingual newsletter
chronicling news on the evolution of different peace museums in Japan and their exhibits. He
discusses both the obvious narratives about distinctions between Japanese and American atomic
war memory as well as smaller issues such as separation of church and state in Japan or Asian
criticism of Japan’s victim narrative.22
Outside of the research more specifically targeting Japanese aggression, research into
how this type of history is studied and recorded by historians serves as part of the discussion as

Laura Hein, “Curating Controversy: Exhibiting the Second World War in Japan and the United Sates
Since 1995,” International Institute For Asian Studies Newsletter no. 45 (Autumn 2007): 14, accessed November
14, 2016 http://iias.asia/sites/default/files/IIAS_NL45_14.pdf
21

22

Kazuyo Yamane. “Moving Beyond the War Memorial Museum.” Peace Forum, 24, no. 34 (2009): 76.
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well. Michel Rolph-Trouillot is a Haitian Professor of Anthropology and Social Sciences at the
University of Chicago. His research focuses on Haitian history, particularly slave revolts. His
book Silencing The Past uses the Haitian slave revolts as a vehicle to discuss broader issues
about the ways history is remembered and recorded by academics. His theories on “impossible
history” and how cultural preconceptions can alter the way history is discussed in different
contexts apply to the ongoing debate over how Japan deals with its war guilt.
Johan Galtung contributes important theoretical background required to understand the
entire peace museum movement. Galtung is a Norwegian sociologist who pioneered the
discipline of peace and conflict studies in sociology. Central to Galtung’s relevance in this paper
is that his definition of what constitutes a “peace museum” is used to classify Japanese peace
museums in the broader global context. He distinguishes war and peace museums and the factors
he uses to differentiate the two are key to the discussion of Japan’s presentation of its war
memories. Also, his views on “positive peace” through “equity…cooperation for mutual and
equal benefit,” are central to understanding the origins of Japan’s conflict with China about
WWII and the continued enmity between the two countries.23
The Struggle for Control of the Narrative
The struggle over Japan’s presentation of its World War II memories in Asia started as a
result of evolving relations between Japan and the People’s Republic of China in the years after
Mao Tse-Tung’s regime. After Japan and the PRC normalized diplomatic relations in 1972,
discussions about Japan’s wartime aggression against China, Korea, and much of Asia became a

Johan Galtung, “How do you define ‘positive peace’?” Envision Peace Museum, July 9, 2012, accessed
November 14, 2016, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RYFn_hSF3wQ
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political issue as well as intellectual discourse. Katsuichi Honda’s Chugoku no tabi [Trip to
China] started many of the key debate points for the left-wing critical view of Japan’s wartime
past by utilizing Chinese eyewitness sources to support the narrative and challenging denials
made using Japanese soldiers’ accounts. These kinds of published works combined with the
recovery and distribution of video footage and photographs led to intensified debate over Japan’s
wartime history.
The opposing perspective, which is more important to the argument of this paper, is a
conservative, nationalist approach embodied by the works of men like Professor Shudo
Higashinakano. For the sake of simplicity, this paper will focus on Higashinakano as a standard
bearer of the conservative nationalist revisionism that characterizes right-wing criticism of those
who push for Japan to remember and atone for its atrocities during World War II. His work
attacks the veracity of the claims of World War II Japanese atrocities and seeks to criticize,
denounce, or undermine any scholarly works that seek to push criticism of Japan’s World War II
history. The most he is willing to acknowledge in regards to Japanese war crimes during the
period is that there are some “malicious individuals,” but that their actions should not be
reflective of the Japanese Imperial Army as a whole.24
Outside of these two major arguments that have defined the debate since the end of
World War II, a third argument has longer lasting implications for Japanese museums of World
War II: the “liberal” approach championed by Nobukatsu Fujioka. Fujioka believed that the
continuing debate between apology and national pride has been an unending disaster for
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Japanese national policy without hope for a satisfying conclusion.25 So, Fujioka sought to pursue
a “liberal” view of history whose stated goal was essentially to excoriate and remove any aspect
of Japan’s war history that might be detrimental to ongoing policy. While in practice this is
merely a repetition of the nationalist, rightist wartime pride policy, Fujioka’s approach was seen
as distinct because he was not seen as promoting national pride and merely removing sources of
conflict that dogged the previous two arguments.
The Origins of the “Peace” Museums: Early Years of the Osaka Peace Center
In 1992, the first conference of the International Network of Peace Museums met in
Bradford, UK.26 Representatives from 10 countries including the United States, Japan, and
Australia met to organize, exchange ideas, and plan for future efforts. The International Network
of Peace Museums has held eight conferences in total with a ninth planned for April 2017 in
Belfast. The International Network of Museums for Peace (as it is now called) has been granted
NGO status and has expanded the scope of its duties to account for more countries and different
political scenarios.
The 1980’s and early 1990’s represented a period of transition amongst some groups in
Japan with regards to public discussions of Japan’s World War II war memories. Criticism of
war efforts spread as a result of anti-nuclear sentiment and worldwide derision of US military
action in Vietnam. One of the earliest peace museums, the Osaka War Memorial Exhibition
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Room for Peace, opened in Osaka in 1970’s.27 This exhibition was one of many temporary
exhibitions set up to showcase public support for the cause of peace in Japan. It would also later
become a permanent peace museum called the Osaka International Peace Center.
An event that helped push many of these changes forward was the opening of the Nanjing
Massacre Memorial Hall in 1985.The opening of the Nanjing Massacre Memorial Hall drew
unresolved issues regarding Japanese wartime aggression into the international spotlight.
Increasing contact with the People’s Republic of China made it more difficult for Japan to ignore
discussing wartime atrocities and the erection of public monuments in Chinese museums to
remember those who were raped, robbed, and murdered by Japanese soldiers in China. Other
stories of Japan’s embarrassing lack of discussion about its own World War II past emerged in
the late 1980s, and with Japanese desires for peace and improved relations with neighboring
Asian nations increasing, it was becoming difficult for the Japanese government to avoid
discussing these issues much longer.
The increasing international attention on issues of wartime guilt and discussions of
unresolved conflict increased public desire for permanent museums discussing Japan’s wartime
history to serve as memorials and symbols for peace. As a result of this transition, several
“Peace Museums” opened in Japan during this period. According to UNESCO surveys, eight
permanent peace museums opened in eight different cities between 1992 and 1993 alone.28 These
museums ranged from privately funded collections created by museums to publically funded
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displays intended for tourism. Their exhibits served to paint Japan as both victim and aggressor.
The narratives were usually designed to display a sense of unity with the rest of Asia through
honest portrayals of Japan’s violent past.
Laura Hein argues that intense scrutiny of war narratives in museums both in Japan and
the United States began in earnest in 1995. For the United States, this is in reference to the
debates over the portrayal of the Enola Gay and discussions over what role the dropping of the
atomic bomb played in World War II history. For Japan, after 1995, a severe rightwing backlash
against the peace museum movement began. The exhibits in these museums were seen as being
too horrifying to show to school children and that they promoted a pointlessly harmful picture of
Japan’s past in the name of historical accuracy. As heated and contentious as the right wing
politicians who promoted these political arguments were, these were still restrained arguments.
Far more extreme criticism of the peace museums came from those who believed that the history
these museums displayed never existed. One of the most memorable instances of the extreme
rejection of peace museums and their perceived anti-Japanese depiction of history was Professor
Shudo Higashinakano’s protest lecture within the Osaka International Peace Center.
Crisis over History: The Osaka Peace Center Protests (January 21-23, 2000)
From January 21 to 23, 2000, Professor Shudo Higashinakano organized lectures and
informal protests of exhibits in the Osaka International Peace Center decrying all evidence of
Japanese aggression displayed there as false and misleading. Higashinakano sought to repudiate
the argument put forth by these artifacts and the museum’s narrative that systematic war crimes
were carried out by the Japanese Imperial Army. The protest ironically led to a counter protest
outside the museum as Chinese and Japanese citizens assembled to denounce Higashinakano’s
claims.
19

Higashinakano’s lecture puts forth many of the points that he later reiterated in his books
and his lawsuits against survivors of the Rape of Nanjing. He argued that no evidence existed of
systemic abuse and violence by the Japanese military. He added that the evidence provided by
film, photos, and eyewitnesses is either faked, or represents the actions of one or two deranged
individuals, not the entire Japanese Imperial Army. He criticized the exhibits in Osaka and
elsewhere and attempted to discredit any evidence of Japanese aggression.
Higashinakano’s actions did not go unnoticed. Long lines of people formed outside of the
museum to protest the views the professor expressed in his protest lecture. The protests were
peaceful, but arguments did break out between those who came to hear Professor
Higashinakano’s protests and those who came to protest his views.
Further issues arise when reviewing the footage that was collected by the reporters during
the protests. This footage includes the statements of Japan’s Foreign Minister at the time, Yohei
Kono. He clearly asserted that the views expressed in Professor Higashinakano’s protest
conference were not the views of the Japanese government. The protest reflected private views
of the organizers and the protest organizers presented a view of history independent of the
Japanese government’s wishes.29 Kono’s statement suggested that pressure from private groups,
whose opinions do not reflect the majority opinion in Japan, did influence the presentation of
Japan’s WWII memories, in the Osaka International Peace Center.
Kono’s statement is contradicted by what happened to the museum starting in 2015. As a
publically funded institution, the Osaka International Peace Center was vulnerable to scrutiny
from its government backers. In 2013, Osaka prefectural government placed heavy pressure on
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the museum to alter the contents of its exhibits or face closure. Toru Hashimoto, the governor at
the time, threatened to close the museum, “If the exhibits are determined to be inappropriate.”30
When it was reopened in 2015, Hashimoto’s replacement, Ichiro Matsui, stated that the museum,
“Looks better now,” and that, “I believe exhibitions should not represent the view of one side
when there are diverse perceptions.” 31 This argument is flawed since the only portions of the
museum that were altered or removed are the portions that were designed to showcase that
Japan’s war crimes define its memories of WWII. The current Prime Minister, Shinzo Abe, is
much more in line with this kind of thinking. He stated previously that exhibits such as the pre2014 Fifteen Year War exhibit at the Osaka International Peace Center had been a, “masochistic”
portrayal of Japanese history.32
The New Message: The Censorship of the Osaka International Peace Center (2013-2015)
The Osaka International Peace center opened in 1991 with the goal of prioritizing the
history of the United States bombings of Osaka during World War II while also discussing
Japanese aggression in Asia. The museum discussed topics like the occupation of Korea, the
Nanjing Massacre, and other atrocities. The directors hoped to combine discussions of WWII
aggression on all sides to unite people in the pursuit of peace. The 1991 pamphlet for the
museum stated its operating philosophy on the cover with the following quote: “The Osaka
International Peace Center is conceived in memory of Osaka’s wartime victims and as an
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instrument to set forth new regional support for the cause of peace.”33 As the 21st century
dawned, Japan’s national government and particularly the regional government in Osaka became
increasingly critical of the museum’s brutally honest depiction of Japan’s wartime guilt.
In November 2013 Toru Hashimoto, Osaka Prefectural governor, and his governing
party, Ishin no Kai (Japanese Restoration Party) released a plan to revitalize museums related to
World War II in Osaka.34 The project was part of a broader attempt to promote Japan and more
particularly Osaka by removing public projects that were critical of Japan’s history. It is unclear
how much of this was Ishin no Kai and Toru Hashimoto’s own desire to silence these examples
of criticism, or if the Osaka Prefectural government was attempting to curry favor with Prime
Minister Abe and his national government at the time. Hashimoto was no longer governor by the
time the plan had come to fruition, but Ishin no Kai largely carried out his vision.
Regardless of the source of the criticism, Osaka International Peace Center had been
fighting a losing battle for many years. As a publically funded museum, the Osaka Prefectural
government held the museum’s life in its hands. In previous years, in response to public attacks
on the horrific nature of its exhibits, the museum had been slowly modifying the exhibits that the
prefectural government found objectionable. By 2013, public support for the peace museum
movement waned compared to where it was in the 1990’s. With one final plan, Ishin no Kai
basically left the Osaka International Peace Center with an impossible choice: completely
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remove all objectionable exhibits from the museum or face closure. Peace Osaka ultimately
chose self-censure rather than cease to exist. 35
On September 1, 2014, the Osaka International Peace Center closed for what would end
up being eight months of completely overhauling its exhibits to fall in line with what was
expected of it by Toru Hashimoto and the Ishin no Kai. Years of political pressure by Hashimoto
and his political party to financially strangle museums that did not fit with the prevailing political
vision of Japan’s WWII memory narrative finally resulted in the temporary closure of the Osaka
International Peace Center. The Osaka International Peace Center’s censure took years of
planning, but the degree of its planned censure did not become apparent until fairly late in the
process. In June 2013, the Japanese Citizen’s Network for Peace Museums’ regular newsletter,
Muse, mentioned the event briefly. However, the description of the renewal here only seems to
be designed to commemorate the anniversary of the Osaka Air Raid back on March 3 of that
year. The plans for the museum’s “renewal,” as Hashimoto’s government was calling it were not
made public until November 2013. A year before the museum’s closure, contributors to Muse
expressed concerns that the exhibits regarding Japanese aggression abroad would be deleted
completely according to this plan.36

Parry, “Japanese peace museum removes war crimes exhibits after closure threats,”
http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/news/world/asia/article4432196.ece.
35

“Osaka International Peace Center (Peace Osaka): Osaka City,” Muse: Japanese Citizen’s Network for
Museums for Peace Newsletter, no. 29, (February 2014), 17, accessed October 14, 2016. http://www.tokyosensai.net/muse/muse_PDF_en/muse29en.pdf It is somewhat disheartening how little the newsletter discusses the
proposed changes to Peace Osaka, considering the newsletter’s stated goal of informing and educating the public
about these museums and likely government attempts to tamper with the narratives they displayed. This is the only
mention of the process as the changes were happening until the museum finally closed for “renewal.”
36

23

After the Osaka International Peace Center reopened in April 2015, the biggest victim of
the reductions and alterations to the museum’s exhibits and message was Exhibition Room B on
the first floor. Exhibition Room B discussed “The Fifteen Year War,” referring to Japan’s many
invasions and wartime atrocities throughout Asia. Its exhibits included pictures of dead civilians
and soldierly abuse in addition to explanations of Japan’s colonization of Korea, the military and
industrial development of Manchuria, and other invasions perpetrated by the Japanese.37 The
current museum now uses the space to reemphasize the suffering of the Japanese people in
Osaka due to the bombings of the city by American B-29’s. While this depiction of Osaka was
always part of the Osaka International Peace Center, removing criticism of Japan’s wartime
aggression severs any possible thematic links between what the Japanese suffered during WWII
and what the people of other Asian countries invaded by Japan suffered.
The pamphlets for the Osaka International Peace Center from before and after the
renovations show both the changes to the exhibits themselves and the changed rhetoric of the
museum’s operating mission. The original pamphlet used from 1991 until 2014 has used
statements such as, “We shall not forget that Japan was responsible for the great hardships
suffered by the people of China and the other Asia-Pacific region[s].”38 The overall message
does not criticize Japanese feelings of victimization during World War II, but it also does not
paper over the very real facts of Japanese victimization of many other nations. Furthermore, the
inclusion of an Auschwitz exhibit wing along with extensive discussions of Japan’s colonial and
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military activities in the Asia-Pacific Theater has helped to create a sense of the larger war that
Peace Osaka seeks to reflect on honestly.
Compared with the 1991 pamphlet, the Osaka Peace Museum’s 2015 pamphlet attempts
to make a bland statement about pursuing pacifism and world peace while not addressing Japan’s
culpability in World War II. The following phrase sums up the change: “As we carry out the
exhibition renewal…we have decided to focus on the ‘Osaka Air Raids.’”39 When reading that
statement and being aware of the political pressure and protests, this real message is: “This is all
we are allowed to discuss.” Not only are all references to Japan’s wartime aggression expunged,
but the new message of the Osaka Peace museum retreats from making any argument beyond
Japanese victimization at the end of World War II.
Making the Past Fit the Present: Narratives of Victimization
When discussing Professor Shudo Higashinakano’s book, The Nanking Massacre: Fact
versus Fiction, A Historian’s Quest for the Truth, requires parsing through several disparate
points about the professor himself and his views. When he led the conference at the Osaka Peace
Center Museum, he expressed proudly that, “Even if the Chinese government or Taiwan claim
that there was a massacre of 300,000 people or some scholars claim it to be 200,000, there is no
evidence to back up these theories.”40 He follows this trend of thought in his book. In the
preface, he argues that physical evidence does not exist to corroborate the charges of a massacre
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against the Japanese army.41 He further argues that it serves as political propaganda for revenge
and aggression against Japan. He cites a book discussing potential misconduct and abuse carried
out by US soldiers against the German POW’s after WWII and how Western historians who
criticized that book spoke approvingly of Iris Chang’s The Rape of Nanking.
When looking at his sources, it is difficult to ignore the need to closely scrutinize
Higashinakano’s perspective. He reviews evidence of Japanese military war journals and seeks
to portray any evidence of murder or misconduct as inconsequential problems of war or
breakdowns in military communication. Higashinakano elaborates in extensive detail why many
of the problems with discussing the “Nanking Massacre” occur. Higashinakano claims too many
scholars were unaware of the extensive wartime propaganda by Nationalist Chinese agents to
manipulating the Western press.42 His evidence of this again falls back on critiques of the
historians. He questions the reliability of What War Means by citing the work of Theodore
White, who was one of Bates’s successors working in Chongqing, who stated in a memoir that,
“In reality, I was employed to manipulate American public opinion…It was considered
necessary to lie to it, to deceive it.”43 He assumes that because White and Bates both worked in
the Nationalist Party’s Information Office at roughly the same time, Bates’s sources are
unreliable for fear of deliberate manipulation. His arguments even acknowledge but ultimately
dismiss the trials carried by the Women’s International War Crimes Tribunal held in Tokyo in

Shudo Higashinakano, The Nanking Massacre: Fact vs Fiction: A Historian’s Quest for the Truth
(Tokyo: Sekai Shuppan Inc., 2005), i-ii.
41

42

Higashinakano, The Nanking Massacre, 251-286.

43

Theodore H. White, In Search of History: A Personal Adventure (New York: Harper & Row Publishers,

1978), 76.

26

December of 2000. He argues that the “Nanking Massacre, which was originally used as a
propaganda tool, was resurrected to help justify the Tokyo Trials.”44
If his major argument against the “Nanking Massacre” is a lack of evidence to support
the claims of organized atrocity, then his protest of the exhibits at the Osaka Peace Center
Museum and his dismissal of the eyewitness accounts of survivors at the Women’s International
War Crimes Tribunal becomes even more questionable. Another statement of his recorded at the
Osaka Peace Center protests calls his views into question: “You have to differentiate between the
acts of some malicious individuals and the systematic conduct of the Japanese military.”45 Based
on transcripts of the judges’ statements at the Tribunal, the judges made it quite clear that they
intended to render judgment based on what laws existed at the time of the event. Even with that
caveat, they still found immense evidence from multiple eyewitness sources from several
different countries of the organized rape and enslavement of Chinese women by the Japanese
military.46 With so much information obtained from diverse first-hand accounts with sufficient
consistency about the system of abuse and the various crimes committed, what evidence is
Professor Higashinakano looking for to verify the events in Nanking? At what point does
questioning the evidence become simply denying the existence of the evidence? Also, choosing
to look for the most benign explanation of what is written in the war journals of Japanese
soldiers and then referring to Western sources about Nanking from the time as victims of a
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Chinese Nationalist public relations conspiracy suggests rationalization instead of explanation. It
falls into the trap of what Rolph-Trouillot would refer to as “impossible history,” which he
explains as follows: “When reality does not coincide with deeply held beliefs, human beings tend
to phrase interpretations that force reality within the scope of these beliefs.”47
Reductive and evasive interpretations of history appear, according to Trouillot, when the
facts of the events in question contradict or call into question deeply held beliefs on the part of
the authors. Toru Hashimoto, the prefectural governor of Osaka, who largely pushed for the
censorship of Peace Osaka, made several comments during his tenure that tend to fit into such a
mindset. In 2013, he was quoted by the press as saying, “comfort women (system) was necessary
in order to provide relaxation for those brave soldiers who had been in the line of fire.”48 In
context, Hashimoto stated that he feels that the Japanese government should apologize for the
treatment of women as part of the comfort system and compares it to systems of brothels run by
Nazi Germany in World War II and in Japan under post-World War II American Occupation.
Comparing Japan’s forced enslavement of conquered women to Allied systems of brothels in
Germany or comfort women in Japan bare investigation, but this statement still fits into a
category that Trouillot calls, “tools of trivialization.”49 The term references rhetorical, narrative
and interpretative tools used to downplay, ignore or trivialize the nature of historical events
because they do not fit into widely held beliefs and narratives.
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Religion vs. History: Hiroshima Peace Museum
Several of the museums that were visited during onsite research in Japan set forth an
issue that is an unavoidable question when discussing wartime history museums in Japan: are
Japan’s war time museums places of religious worship or visual archives of Japanese wartime
history? Furthermore, does being a place of worship exempt these museums from criticism for
depictions of history that are at best erroneous if not outright revisionist? In the case of the site of
the atomic bombings at Hiroshima, a strong case can be made that these sites hold a religious
significance that requires a certain level of reverence. For an American comparison, even if
Confederate soldiers fought to maintain the right for states to control the legality of slavery, it
would be inappropriate to go to a cemetery of Confederate soldiers and set up history exhibits
explaining the horrific acts these men may have committed. However, the Hiroshima Memorial
Peace Museum has to contend with the fact that it serves the roles of both museum and site for
reverent remembrance. As a site for both religious worship and historic memory, can the
museum be expected to be both reverent to those who died for their country and accurate to the
wider historical context that these men took place in? Should that be the goal?
In an interview with the director of the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum, Kawamoto
Yoshitaka, Ian Buruma discussed a controversy occurring in Japan in the late 1980’s. The
controversy in question refers to a petition for the addition of an “Aggressor’s Corner” to the
Hiroshima Peace Museum as a result of questions posed by middle school students from Osaka
visiting the museum in 1987. These questions included asking why the United States dropped the
atomic bomb on Hiroshima, what the nature of the war that led to the bomb being dropped was,
why the fact that several of the people who died at Hiroshima were Korean slave workers
imported by the Imperial Japanese army was downplayed, and other questions related to
29

Japanese war guilt.50 During the discussion, Kawamoto told Buruma that he felt that the younger
generation of Japanese students (presumably referencing the ones who brought the criticism) no
longer knew what endurance was and did not understand what the people of Japan went through
during the war. He then went on to state that the criticisms being brought forth by these students
are likely just being fed to them by their (left wing?) teachers and that they are inappropriate for
discussion in this museum.51 He argued that Hiroshima existed as a place of memory and a
symbol in the fight for world peace and that it should serve as a means of promoting human
solidarity. It should not be used as a point of contention for debates about the historic context
that led to the events at Hiroshima on August 6, 1945.
Director Kawamoto then discusses appropriate historical comparisons with Hiroshima,
and the only appropriate one (according to Kawamoto and several public figures in Hiroshima at
the time) was Auschwitz.52 Kawamoto argues that both Hiroshima and Auschwitz are memory
sites promoting peace and global cooperation. While both locations are sites of memory tied to
warfare, the context of these two sites differs greatly. Hiroshima is a memorial to victimization
by atomic destruction and the cruelty of war. Auschwitz is a memorial to the human cruelty and
abuses that should never be repeated, regardless of war or peacetime. Connecting Hiroshima to
Auschwitz while not discussing Japanese aggression feels misguided and manipulative.
Also, when looking through the most recent pamphlet for the Hiroshima Peace Memorial
Museum, the pamphlet does not present a vision of reverent memory for the events on August 6,
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1945.53 The first sections are devoted to showcasing artifacts of the fallout caused by intense heat
and radioactivity from the bomb. The next several segments mention the diseases, environmental
disasters, and other human tragedies that continued to plague the area for decades after the bomb
was dropped. The only mention of the broader history of World War II in the museum’s structure
is as part of a collage of the context of Hiroshima which covers centuries, making focus
impossible. In the brochure, the only addendum to this regarding the history of the dropping of
the atomic bomb is a series of statements about the development of the bomb. The brochure’s
description argues why the United States developed the atomic bomb, chose to use it, and chose
Hiroshima as one of the targets. The exhibit eschews any mention of World War II in the
museum’s pamphlet beyond this reference to American anti-Soviet policies in Japan at the end of
the war. Other potential reasons that the pamphlet mentions include ending the war quickly and
limiting potential casualties, but the pamphlet openly criticizes this argument.54 The museum at
Hiroshima focuses its criticism on the country that dropped the bomb while mostly ignoring
Japan’s role in World War II leading up to the bombing. A vision of these memories that may
critique Japanese aggression and war guilt would apparently distort the message of peace and
solidarity the museum sought to achieve.
Requiring your exhibit to ignore or downplay history for the sake of its message is
somewhat disconcerting since in 1995 Hiroshima’s mayor freely admitted that, “We cannot and
will not deny Japanese aggression, that Japan did evil.”55 Granted, this statement was made in the

Anonymous Author, “East Building (1F),” Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum Pamphlet (Hiroshima,
JP: Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum, 2016).
53

54

Ibid.

Roger B. Jeans, “Victims or Victimizers? Museums, Textbooks, and the War Debate in Japan,” The
Journal of Military History 69, No. 1 (January 2005): 167-168.
55

31

context of sustaining the argument that the use of the atomic bomb was unjustifiably cruel, but
an admission is still an admission. Why none of this is integrated into the main museum tour is
unclear. The portion of the museum dedicated to discussing the broader war and Japan’s role in it
is separate from the main tour and this portion of the building was closed for maintenance at the
time of research.56 Hopefully “maintenance” does not mean a full overhaul of the exhibits similar
to what occurred at the Osaka International Peace Center.
The Hiroshima Memorial Museum, more than any of the other museums present in this
paper, is not designed to allow questioning of its exhibits or its narrative. The constant crowds
and the structure of the Hiroshima museum do not lend themselves to in-depth exploration of the
exhibits. Tour groups composed mostly of school children come through constantly and the
museum’s limited interior is filled with people. Giant crowds in each tour and the pace of the
tours makes it difficult to examine most of the exhibits. The exhibits that are given the most
room to allow for some lingering inspections are the exhibits likely meant to horrify the
audience. The first major room features a diorama of Hiroshima with a red sphere meant to
represent the atomic bomb one second after its detonation. Explicit mannequins of people with
flesh melting off of their face and limbs, pictures of the immediate aftermath of the bombings
(with lots of fire, debris, levelled buildings, etc.), a replica of the bomb dropped on Hiroshima,
and maps giving a sense of how much of the city was destroyed in the bombing overwhelm
audiences. The second room features ghastly photos of “black rain,” sores and cancers caused by
radiation, terrible burns, and scientific explanations of just how much ongoing destruction and
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devastation the bomb wreaked on the people of Hiroshima. The fact that Japan’s history of
aggression in the war is only vaguely represented as part of a broader history of the city of
Hiroshima is likely an intentional choice by the designers to avoid muddying the narrative of the
museum with any discussions of Japan’s conduct towards other countries during the war. Former
director of the museum Yoshitaka Kawamoto would likely argue that the museum is not about
any of that.57
The Yushukan Museum: Public Criticism versus Private Reverence
The Yushukan Museum faces a similar issue of presenting wartime memories while also
attempting to discuss history. Yushukan is located on the grounds of the Yasukuni Shrine and
because of this, the conflict between reverence for the dead and remembrance of the war is
apparent. Yushukan is probably the most well-known museum of World War II history in Japan
in the West and likely also the most criticized. The narrative of World War II in Japan presented
in the museum has been critiqued as being highly revisionist. Roger B. Jeans points out that the
museum’s viewpoint of Japan as unwilling aggressors pushed into war by United States political
and economic pressure rings false when it refuses to mention Japanese aggression against Korea,
China, and other Pacific nations.58
Yushukan is also a much more difficult museum to clearly define as a site of memory.
The museum resides on the grounds of a shrine, and a central theme of Yushukan’s exhibits is
Japan’s long history of warfare and the traditional nobility of the military spirit in Japan.
However, the museum is also clearly a presentation of WWII history for Japan as they would
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like to remember it. The vast majority of the artifacts on display both in the museum and in the
museum’s English language brochure are from the period of World War II. It also features
artifacts and historical discussions of the Tokugawa, Meiji, Taisho, and several other periods of
Japanese history.59 The tour ends in a room referred to as the “Noble Spirits’ Zone,” and is a
collection of pictures, letters, and other artifacts of soldiers and their families who died fighting
in World War II.
All of this returns to the central question: should Yushukan be allowed to reimagine
history in order to act as a site of religious memory? The museum’s pamphlet states that the
museum’s mission is, “to inherit sincerity and records of enshrined deities [spirits of dead
soldiers] of Yasukuni Jinja.”60 This combines with the prominence of the “Noble Spirits Zone,”
which showcases photos and artifacts of those who died in wars. This is designed to promote a
sense of reverence exempting the museum from overt focus on historical memory. If the museum
were merely a repository of memories and artifacts of those Japanese soldiers who died during
World War II, then its status as a site of religious memory would be easier to accept.
Yushukan also claims to be a place of learning. The name ‘Yushukan’ is derived from
Chinese characters roughly translating as, “a building for learning from scholars on their
travels.”61 If the Yushukan wishes to claim to be a place of learning, then it should be put to task
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on its revisionist take on history. Professor Kazuyo Yamane points out that leaflets distributed
after the museum was renovated in 2002 suggest that the Yushukan’s exhibits represent, “a new
light on modern Japanese history.”62 He then proceeds to refute this claim by discussing several
examples of Japanese World War II atrocities that the Yushukan either fails to address, or frames
as noble, necessary actions taken by the Japanese Imperial Army. As of 2016, the exhibits
discussing Japan’s invasion of mainland China still use the politically controversial term “the
China Incident” to refer to Japan’s military activities from the “Mukden incident” unleashing the
Japanese invasion of Manchuria to the Marco Polo Bridge battle outside Beijing in 1937. The
Nanjing Massacre is referred to only as an “operation,” not an atrocity and a war crime. Japanese
newspaper articles from the period only suggest that the Chinese troops were undisciplined and
poorly led. Discussions of Japanese military behavior both during the invasion and after are
virtually non-existent.63
Yushukan’s narrative is structured so that visitors will only learn what the government
sponsors want them to learn. Professor Yamane shows that Japanese individuals who are still
alive and old enough to remember the horrors of the war are more critical of the Yushukan
museum.64 Amongst the younger generations, people are split between those who find a form of
nostalgia for the national spirit represented at the museum and those who feel Japan either needs
to openly apologize for its atrocities or at least reflect on its wartime aggression. Also, Johan
Galtung would say that this representation of history is self-serving and does not promote equal
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cooperation or equal mutual benefit. It only aids those who wish to glorify their past. In this
museum, Japan ignores what Galtung refers to as the two key blockages to true, positive peace:
“trauma [violence from the past] and unresolved conflict [in this case with China and itself].65
Mild Criticism? Ritsumeikan University Kyoto Museum for World Peace
The Kyoto Museum for World Peace is a rarity amongst current peace museums in Japan.
Residing on Ritsumeikan University’s campus in Kyoto and serving as a peace museum in a
major Japanese city that openly states that the Japanese Imperial Army committed atrocities
against different Asian and Pacific nations during World War II. A large portion of its main,
permanent exhibit is devoted to the “Fifteen Year War” (one of the other names Japan uses for
WWII, 1931-1945). In these exhibits, there are pictures of comfort women, piles of bodies from
air raids, and stories referencing deliberate mistreatment of POW’s by the Japanese army. In one
panel, the exhibit explicitly states, “By the beginning of the 15-Year War, Japan had already
colonized Korea, Taiwan…people in the colonies were forced to work.”66 According to
Professor Yamane, the museum also at some point showed photos of Chinese civilians being
buried alive in Nanjing.67
The Kyoto museum also promotes the type of dialogue that Galtung would argue is
essential for positive peace. In 2002, a Dutchman visited Ritsumeikan University and spoke of
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the poor treatment of Dutch POW’s by the Japanese.68 He went on to state that dropping the
atomic bomb saved many POW’s lives by ending the war quickly. A Japanese student
questioned him about the necessity of the atomic bombs and what Dutch colonial policies were
like and how that history is taught in the Netherlands. The argument ended there because the
Dutchman refused to discuss it further, but this open dialogue about Japanese aggression and the
complicated historical context of the time shows the effect of honest portrayals of history in
museums. People need to be able to discuss their memories and feelings about war honestly and
confront each other with differing opinions. Silencing the past to avoid an argument only results
in the argument never being resolved.
Why is the Kyoto Museum for World Peace allowed to discuss issues that have caused
the censorship of museums like the Osaka International Peace Center? Part of the reason is likely
that Ritsumeikan University in Kyoto is a private institution. According to Professor Kazuyo
Yamane, The Kyoto Museum for World Peace is the only peace memorial museum that exists on
a university campus.69 He argues that, “Public peace museums in Japan tend to exhibit only
about Japan’s victim side of the war while private peace museums exhibit Japan’s aggression
honestly.”70 Public museums have the disadvantage of being subject to a changing national
politics of history. In the late 1990s, the support for more honest depictions of Japanese
aggression waned and museums that were not privately controlled faced scrutiny, criticism, and
loss of funding. The Kyoto Museum for World Peace was opened in 1992, at the height of the
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peace museum boom in Japan. Its private status allowed it to survive the political purge of these
museums that occurred later.
However, another idea to consider is that the Kyoto Museum for World Peace criticized
Japanese wartime aggression in the broader context of warfare in the 20th century. While a
majority of the exhibits in the permanent museum focus on Japan and World War II, several of
them discuss other aspects of conflict in the 20th century. Beyond Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the
Kyoto Museum for World Peace discusses the potentially dire implications of nuclear destruction
and the Cold War tensions that could ignite conflicts worldwide.71 There is even a small Godzilla
toy used to reference Gojira (1954), a Japanese monster film serving as a dark, horrifying
allegory for nuclear war. The combination of the museum’s private ownership and its attempts to
discuss Japanese aggression in the broader context of 20th century conflicts and atrocities are the
likely reasons this museum’s critical narrative has survived unscathed.
Potential Political Issues Resulting from the Mindset of Censorship
The proof that issues of the past effect the present rest in the public portrayal of Japan’s
wartime aggression as being largely minimized in favor of the victimization narrative is a part of
the political plans of the current leadership of the Liberal Democratic Party. The viewpoint of
Prime Minister Abe and the LDP regarding negative portrayals of Japan’s military past is
partially due to the political decisions currently being pursued in the National Diet. Specifically,
Prime Minister Abe is hoping to push through a referendum to remove, or at least alter, Article 9
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of the Japanese Constitution.72 Article 9 refers to the promise Japan’s reformed government
made to renounce its right as a government to declare and wage war. This is still true even
though the Japanese Self Defense Forces are a very well-trained, highly technologically
advanced military force, and Abe wants to use these forces abroad in what he refers to as “proactive pacifism.”73 In an interview with Jonathan Tepperman, Tepperman asked Abe if this
desire for freedom to use Japan’s military offensively was in any way a form of preparation for
war with China. Abe did not indicate any desire for war, but he stated that Japan would not
simply demur before aggressive Chinese politics and that Japan simply wanted the freedom to
assist its treaty and security allies without prior approval.74
Disassociating from controversial or politically damaging aspects of a nation’s history is
not a problem unique to Japan. Post-World War II Germany also provides many appropriate
parallels when viewing the evolution of discussions of the Holocaust in German history.
Throughout the 1950’s, most discourse in Germany about World War II focused on victimization
of the German people by the Allies during their invasion of Europe. According to Daniel Levy
and Natan Sznaider, the public trials of those who worked at Auschwitz in Frankfurt brought the
worst abuses of the Nazi regime before the eyes of the public. However, these criticisms were
not meant to instill a sense of grief or remorse for the Jewish victims. Instead, it brought forth a
series of arguments criticizing either the current West German politics of history or how the
Imperial German regime and how its capitalist construction led to Nazi fascism.75
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Acknowledgment of the crimes of the Nazi state became the political agenda of the New Left in
West Germany while simultaneously disassociating the current German people from the abuses
and atrocities of the Nazi regime.76
Something similar has been occurring in Japan in the past few years. The widespread
praise and support for the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum in Japan, in contrast to the
governor of Osaka referring to the exhibits in Osaka Peace Center as “inappropriate,” suggests
an attempt to criticize the violent and bloody wars in the history of Japan without specific
criticism of the Japanese Imperial Army’s atrocities. The victimization narrative requires
distancing Japan from its war crimes and any valid complaints from the surviving victims. Even
their museums that are more open about the Japanese committing war crimes in WWII still have
a tendency to obfuscate Japanese war guilt. In a discussion of war crimes from the website of the
Kyoto Museum for World Peace at Ritsumeikan University, the following text sums up the
approach of these museums that are more open to criticizing Japan: “the use of toxic gases
during the war with China and the experimentation on live subjects by Unit 731 are certainly war
crimes, yet those responsible were never brought to justice because the American authorities
decided it was not in their best interests to prosecute them.”77
American complicity in the desire to deny and remove Japan’s wartime atrocities from
history should not be ignored. In concrete terms, one of the arguments made by the defense
attorneys for the prosecuted Japanese war criminals is that the actions taken by the Japanese
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soldiers in China cannot be considered illegal because there was no law at the time to judge them
for the acts they committed.78 Although, the Emperor of Japan was the leader of the Japanese
government during World War II, at least on paper, assessing Hirohito’s personal guilt in the
Japanese war effort is difficult. The United States needed a functional Japanese government to
repel communism in the early years of the Cold War. MacArthur and the Military Tribunal
largely exempted high level government and military officials such as the Emperor to allow for
smoother transition into the Cold War.
Given the United States’s decision to exonerate many of Japan’s war criminals, do the
Japanese feel that many war criminals amongst the Japanese people are left that need to be
convicted of war crimes? Why would they not hold themselves accountable? Discussing blame
while denying guilt runs into the same issue that was discussed with the West German New Left
criticizing the Nazi regime in the 1960’s. Subsequent generations after WWII are willing to
admit that war crimes were committed but they do not want to see war criminals prosecuted and
convicted. The Kyoto Museum for World Peace at Ritsumeikan University does admit that
individuals have filed lawsuits against the Japanese government for war crimes. There are even
photos in the museum of a case where Chinese citizens initiated lawsuits against Japanese
individuals and won.79 However, individual cases do not solve the core problem. Just as
Professor Higashinakano argued that you have to distinguish between a few bad soldiers and the
systematic behavior of the Japanese army. The prosecution of individual cases only does so
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much to help alleviate the tension caused by Japan’s rather inconsistent handling of presentations
of its war time atrocities.80
Conclusion
The censorship of the Osaka International Peace Center makes it clear that these Japanese
museums controlled by the government are not allowed to discuss World War II. The censored
Osaka museum only mentions atrocities committed against Japan and not anything that occurred
in the previous fifteen years during the Japanese war of oppression. Any criticisms of the new
museum’s gutted narrative are buried under the excuse that this museum’s new narrative is more
even-handed to people with differing opinions on the factualness of history. The ruling Liberal
Democratic Party decided what people deserve to know and removed everything else.
The story of the Osaka Peace museum’s treatment fits into broader trends of the
dilemmas facing all Japanese peace museums. Japan is still committed to peace, but it refuses to
accept its wartime past honestly and prefers to bury its uncomfortable history. This results in
museums with widely divergent histories. Yushukan paints the Fifteen Year War as a noble
cause that the Imperial Army was forced into by foreign aggressors. The Kyoto Museum for
World Peace admits that Japan committed atrocities and attempts to discuss them in the context
of all of the violence in the 20th century. Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum acts as though
World War II was nothing but the dropping of the atomic bomb without any further context.
While the Japanese government cannot control private museums, it can force public
museums like Peace Osaka to silence the history of Japanese war crimes on display and how the
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government wants its World War II past discussed. Government pressure will bury this history
where it can so Japan can avoid critical links between Japan’s wartime atrocities and the current
Prime Minister’s efforts to restore Japan’s ability to deploy its military overseas. Despite past
attempts to link the horrors of Auschwitz to the horrors of Hiroshima, Japan’s government does
not want people comparing them to the Nazis. At home, they are trapped in the position of
promoting unity at home by burying the issue of Japanese war crimes committed during World
War II. However they also must discuss the issue for the sake of diplomatic relations with Asian
neighbors. Japan’s sponsored Peace Museums are victims of this uneven, dishonest, and
vacillating policy.
The curator of the new Osaka International Peace Center exhibit said that it is necessary
for museums to make history easy to understand for the public. That is a worthy goal, but it does
not mean that museums should simply remove the dark chapters of their nation’s history because
the government wants it forgotten. Japan needs to honestly admit to its World War II atrocities
and discuss them openly. The peace museums discussed here were, until recently, an effective
way to do that. The museums cannot simply change their exhibits due to the whims of the current
government. Ideological consistency requires commitment. Japan has to either retreat from the
outside world if it does not want to discuss its history honestly or simply come clean about its
history. If Japan wants to retain good relations with its neighbors, particularly with China and
Korea, a fair account of the past is essential. If Japan does choose to come clean, it must be made
clear. Government policies cannot be allowed to placate those who are still embarrassed by
atrocious history. A candid politics of history is painful, and the censorship of these museums
has simply buried that pain temporarily. It is not a long term solution because Japan’s difficult
World War II chapters of history are not going away in the eyes of the world.
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